Southeast Europe is not the world’s largest LNG market, but it is still exposed to any disruption in global LNG flows. Week 23 highlighted why. Around 20% of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and more than 85%of those volumes normally go to Asian markets. If those flows are disrupted, the impact would reach SEE through gas prices, LNG competition and power-market marginal costs.
The immediate issue is Qatari LNG. Qatar is a major supplier to Asia, and any disruption would force Asian buyers to secure alternative cargoes. Europe’s direct dependence on Qatari LNG has declined to around 8% of total imports, but that does not eliminate risk. LNG is a global market. If Asian buyers bid more aggressively for cargoes, Europe must pay more to attract supply.
The report notes that European benchmark gas prices may need to rise 40–50% from current levels to secure sufficient LNG if disruptions to Qatari exports persist. With TTF already averaging €48.56/MWh during Week 23 and the one-month forward near €49.335/MWh, such an increase would be material for power pricing.
US LNG cannot easily fill the gap. Export facilities were operating at approximately 94% utilisation, leaving limited spare capacity. This means the adjustment mechanism would be price, not immediate additional supply. Europe would have to compete for available cargoes, pushing TTF higher.
For SEE, the link comes through several channels. Italy, Greece and Croatia all have LNG import infrastructure that affects regional gas balance. During Week 23, LNG inflows to Greece recovered to 860.32 GWh, Italy received 2,836.03 GWh, and Croatia received 645.30 GWh. These terminals are not peripheral assets; they are part of the region’s supply-security architecture.
Higher LNG prices would feed into gas-fired power generation. That matters most during evening peaks, low-wind periods and high-demand weeks. In Week 23, Turkish gas-fired power generation jumped 278.1%, while thermal generation across SEE rose 24.5%. If gas prices rise sharply, the cost of this balancing response rises with them.
A Hormuz shock would also affect industrial electricity buyers. Even companies without direct gas exposure can face higher power prices if gas-fired generation sets marginal prices. Steel, aluminium, cement, fertiliser, chemicals and data centres would all feel the effect through electricity costs, hedging needs and procurement risk.
The impact would not be uniform. Markets with stronger hydro or lignite availability may be less immediately exposed than gas-heavy systems. But because SEE markets are interconnected, higher prices in Italy, Greece or Hungary can influence flows and spreads across the Balkans.
The key lesson is that SEE energy security is now linked to global maritime chokepoints. The region’s gas exposure is no longer only about Russian pipeline routes or local storage. It is also about LNG cargo competition between Europe and Asia. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would not need to land directly in the Balkans to reprice Balkan electricity.
Elevated by energy.clarion.engineer